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Abstract
To investigate the effect of the mental representation of attachment on information processing, 28 anxiety disorder
outpatients, as diagnosed by the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule—Revised, were administered the Adult
Attachment Interview and the State–Trait Anxiety Inventory. They also completed an emotional Stroop task with
subliminal and supraliminal exposure conditions, a free recall memory task, and a recognition test. All tasks
contained threatening, neutral, and positively valenced stimuli. A nonclinical comparison group of 56 participants
completed the same measures. Results on the Stroop task showed color-naming interference for threatening words in
the supraliminal condition only. Nonclinical participants with insecure attachment representations showed a global
response inhibition to the Stroop task. Clinical participants with secure attachment representations showed the
largest Stroop interference of the threatening words compared to the other groups. Results on the free recall task
showed superior recall of all types of stimuli by participants with secure attachment representations. In the
outpatient group, participants with secure attachment representations showed superior recall of threatening words on
the free recall task, compared to insecure participants. Results on the recognition task showed no differences
between attachment groups. We conclude that secure attachment representations are characterized by open
communication about and processing of threatening information, leading to less defensive exclusion of negative
material during the attentional stage of information processing and to better recall of threatening information in a
later stage. Attachment insecurity, but not the type of insecurity, seems a decisive factor in attention and memory
processes.
Mental representations of attachment in adults search but has not yet been investigated
extensively (Belsky, Spritz, & Crnic, 1996;are thought to regulate cognition and behavior
through the selective processing of attach- Bretherton & Munholland, 1999; Kirsh &
Cassidy, 1997; Lynch & Cicchetti, 1991;ment-relevant information. This notion is ba-
sic to recent developments in attachment re- Main, 1999). Belsky et al. (1996) noted that
the concept of attachment representations (or
internal working models of attachment) isThe authors acknowledge the statistical support of Wil-
routinely invoked to explain or predict empiri-lem van der Kloot and the constructive comments of the
reviewers. The contributions of the first and the second cal findings, and there is little empirical evi-
authors to this paper are equal. dence to substantiate this latent variable. The
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Attachment theory (Ainsworth, Blehar, Wa- psychodynamical, ethological, and cognitive
aspects of development with an information-ters, & Wall, 1978; Bowlby, 1973, 1980, 1984;
Bretherton, 1985; Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, processing model of cognition. In the past de-
cades, cognitive psychologists have devel-1985) proposes that mental representations of
attachment relationships emerge in childhood oped different models to explain the ways in
which human beings process specific kinds ofexperiences with primary caregivers. These
mental models enable children to anticipate information. The idea that incoming informa-
tion is mentally organized into cognitive rep-their caregivers’ behavior, to interpret it, and
to adapt their own behavior to that of the care- resentations is widely accepted, even though
the exact nature of these mental models isgivers. Parents who are not consistently sensi-
tive and responsive toward the child’s signals an issue of continuing debate (see Williams,
Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). Cogni-of distress or fear are thought to contribute to
the development of an insecure mental repre- tive scientists study the basic rules and mech-
anisms of cognitive organization. Also, in-sentation of attachment. Rejection of attach-
ment, overprotectiveness, and guilt induction formation-processing paradigms have been
applied to different clinical disorders, investi-are all examples of insensitive and unrespon-
sive caregiving (Bretherton, 1985; de Wolff & gating whether specific dysfunctions in infor-
mation processing accompany specific emo-van IJzendoorn, 1997). Regardless of whether
parents are sensitive and responsive or repeat- tional symptoms or syndromes (for a review,
see Mathews & MacLeod, 1994).edly show consistently unresponsive or incon-
sistently responsive behavior toward a child,
the attachment behavioral reaction of the child Attachment and Cognitive Processing
toward the parents will become so “over-
learned” that its rules may be applied auto- Mental representations of attachment are
thought to direct not only feelings and behav-matically and outside awareness (Kirsh &
Cassidy, 1997; Main, 1999). The total set of ior but also cognitive processes related to at-
tachment, such as attention and memory (Main,these rules, known as the internal working
model or mental representation of attachment, 1999; Main et al., 1985). Bowlby (1980) ex-
trapolated on the idea that human beings se-may, once established, become increasingly
resistant to change in the course of time, be- lectively attend to sensory information to es-
cape from information overload. Due to thecause it functions on an automatic level (Bel-
sky et al., 1996; Rieder & Cicchetti, 1989). filtering of incoming information by the tacit
organizational rules of the internal workingThis internal working model of attachment is
defined as “ . . . a set of conscious and/or un- model, attention is directed toward informa-
tion that fits the representation. Attachment-conscious rules for the organization of infor-
mation relevant to attachment and for ob- related information that, as a result of its (af-
fective) content, does not fit the expectanciestaining or limiting access to . . . information
regarding attachment-related experiences, is defensively excluded. Consequently, the
original representations of attachment are con-feelings and ideations” (Main et al., 1985, pp.
66–67). Because these representations regu- firmed and ever more rigidly established. The
memory system is subject to the same kinds oflate information processing, expectations, and
decision making in affective relationships, biases at the levels of encoding and retrieving
information. Information that smoothly fits thethey tend to become self-confirming (Belsky
et al., 1996; Bretherton & Munholland, 1999; existing representations is suggested to be
easily stored and easily reproduced (see Wil-Main et al., 1985). Consequently, mental at-
tachment representations established in child- liams et al., 1997).
On a cognitive level, secure or secure–hood are thought to be of considerable in-
fluence on future attachment relationships autonomous attachment is reflected by open,
nondefensive mental operations regarding at-(Waters, Merrick, Treboux, Crowell, & Al-
bersheim, 2000). tachment-related experiences, as shown in the
Adult Attachment Interview (AAI; George,In attachment theory, Bowlby combined
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Kaplan, & Main, 1985; Hesse, 1999; Main, cure attachment representations. In this task,
participants are asked to name the color in1990). When interviewed about their child-
hood memories, secure–autonomous respon- which words of different emotional value are
printed. Response latencies indicate interfer-dents give a balanced view of their past expe-
riences—even when these experiences were ence of the word content with the primary
task: color naming. Reaction times slow downnegative—and talk about their history in a
clear and coherent way. Dismissing attach- when the word is associated with participants’
concerns and thus distracts them from theirment is revealed in the AAI by a claim for
limited access to memories related to attach- task. We expect adults with insecure attach-
ment representations to differ in their responsement. These respondents show restricted feel-
ings regarding attachment experiences and of- latencies from secure–autonomous participants.
Because little research has been conducted inten contradict themselves by presenting a
general idealizing view of their attachment this area, we suggest two competing hypothe-
ses. The first hypothesis is that insecure par-figures that cannot be corroborated by posi-
tive episodic memories. Preoccupied attach- ticipants show more response interference to
threat words than secure–autonomous partici-ment is revealed in the AAI by ambivalence
about attachment experiences. These respon- pants. The insecure participants may show
longer response latencies on the threat words,dents often talk in a very incoherent way
about their past and show confusion about or as these are supposed to arouse anxiety, di-
recting attention away from task performancecontinuing anger with their major attachment
figures. There is a fourth classification for an (cf., MacLeod & Hagan, 1992; van den Hout,
Tenney, Huygens, Merckelbach, & Kindt,unresolved state of mind with respect to loss
or trauma; this is coded when respondents 1995). The alternative hypothesis is that inse-
cure participants may be less inclined to evenshow signs of disorganization or disorienta-
tion during discussions of potentially trau- start processing incoming information of a
threatening type, whereas secure–autonomousmatic events. The indices for the unresolved
attachment category in the AAI are not rep- subjects may be more open to disconcerting
information and pay threatening stimuli moreresentative of the overall state of mind with
regard to attachment; consequently, individuals attention (Beeghly & Cicchetti, 1994), even
though it seems discrepant with their currentclassified as unresolved receive a best-fitting
alternate classification as secure–autonomous, attachment representation (Lynch & Cicchetti,
1998). Evidence for differential attention pro-dismissing, or preoccupied. Dozier and Kobak
(1992) showed that the cognitive representa- cesses in individuals with different types of
insecure representations is equivocal. Main ettional organizations are associated with spe-
cific strategies for either deactivation (in the al. (1985) and Kirsh and Cassidy (1997), for
example, showed that nonclinical insecure–case of dismissing attachment) or hyperacti-
vation (in the case of preoccupied attachment) avoidant, as well as insecure–resistant, chil-
dren looked away from attachment-relevantof the attachment system (see also Main,
1990). A most striking finding is the height- drawings or family photographs in a stressful
context and both groups appeared to avoidened autonomous physiological arousal their
nonclinical respondents showed when using a arousing painful memories of past experi-
ences with their caregivers. In view of thedeactivating strategy, for example, when play-
ing down the importance of negative child- dearth of empirical studies on adults, we are
not in the position to propose specific hypoth-hood experiences with separation, rejection,
or threat by the parents. eses concerning information processing in
preoccupied and dismissing adults.
Selectivity in information processing asso-Attention
ciated with insecure attachment representa-
tions may be more pronounced in clinicallyIn the current study, we investigate interfer-
ence on an emotional Stroop task in clinical disordered groups, in particular in anxiety dis-
ordered individuals. The theory of internaland nonclinical adults with secure and inse-
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working models of attachment shows simi- The priming process can be experimentally
modeled using the emotional Stroop task. Thelarity to Beck’s schema model of cognitive
processing in psychopathology (Beck, 1976; elaboration process can be experimentally
modeled in memory tests.Beck & Emery, 1985). In Beck’s view, cogni-
tive schemata result from experience and Memory researchers distinguish explicit
memory, which concerns conscious recollec-guide new information along the processing
lines that experience has formed. Biases in in- tion, from implicit memory, which involves
nonconscious effects of past experiences onformation processing result from systematic
distortions in cognitive schemata that have subsequent information processing. Explicit
memory depends on the extent to which thebeen strengthened by perceptual sensitivity
and memory biases for information congruent activated schema, at the time of encoding, is
related to other associated representations thatwith the schema. For anxiety disorder pa-
tients, Beck’s model predicts hypervigilance are used as retrieval cues. In a free recall test,
explicit memory is activated by specificallyin the processing of threatening information.
In a recent review, Williams, Mathews, and asking participants to consciously retrieve
previously processed material. Poor memoryMacLeod (1996) showed that in many Stroop
studies, anxious participants let the content of performance on a free recall test is supposed
to indicate poor elaboration of the stimuli of-the stimuli interfere with their task of naming
the color in which the stimulus words were fered. Recognition performance is expected to
be superior to recall performance, because itprinted, especially when the emotional va-
lence of the stimulus material was threatening is easier to recognize previously processed
stimuli than to recall them. Cloitre and Lie-and personally relevant. Even at a preattentive
level, with stimuli presented subliminally, this bowitz (1991) refer to a free recall task as
measuring semantic memory whereas a recog-attentional bias has been shown to be active
(MacLeod & Hagan, 1992; MacLeod & Ruth- nition task concerns perceptual memory.
Evidence for a memory bias in anxiety dis-erford, 1992; Mogg, Bradley, Williams, &
Mathews, 1993; Mogg, Kentish, & Bradley, orders is equivocal and the results even
contradict each other (for an overview, see1993; van den Hout et al., 1995). From this
experimental research it may be concluded Mineka & Nugent, 1995): few studies have
provided empirical evidence for an explicitthat patients suffering from anxiety disorders
are characterized by an (automatic) attentional memory bias in anxiety patients; some studies
have reported an implicit memory bias relatedbias for threat stimuli.
to clinical anxiety. The studies of memory bi-
ases in anxiety disorders are not only incon-Memory
sistent in their results, but also in the applied
paradigms (Eysenck & Mogg, 1992). In viewBeck’s model was refined by Williams et al.
(1997), who make a distinction between pas- of the controversial findings in anxiety disor-
der samples, McNally (1994) suggests that re-sive–automatic and active–strategic process-
ing of information. They show that these are searchers concentrate on involuntary explicit
memory paradigms to specify the effects oftwo independent cognitive processes that may
explain dissociations in the performance of anxiety disorders on memory performance.
Involuntary explicit memory is like explicitanxious and depressed patients on cognitive
tasks. Referring to the distinction made by memory in that it involves conscious recollec-
tion, but like implicit memory in that it in-Graf and Mandler (1984), they distinguish
two processes that operate on mental repre- volves no strategic effort. According to Mc-
Nally, in anxiety disorder patients threateningsentations. Priming is a relatively automatic
process in which exposure to a stimulus acti- information just “pops” into mind without de-
liberate search, and therefore involuntary ex-vates an associated schema; elaboration is a
more strategic process whereby associations plicit memory processes should be studied in
these samples.between related representations are formed as
a result of the activation of one representation. In the present study, we investigated
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whether the inconsistent results of memory re- anxiety disorder. We also tested whether anx-
iety disorder participants with insecure at-search in anxiety-disordered individuals may
also be due to differences in the security of tachment representations showed different
emotional Stroop interference compared withtheir attachment representations. In the cur-
rent study, memory was assessed by means of clinical participants with secure attachment
representations. Secure patients may be morea free recall task and a recognition task, both
with positive, neutral, and threatening stimu- open to threatening stimuli that are more sa-
lient to them because of their anxiety disorder,li. We expected to find differences between
secure–autonomous and insecure participants and thus show more Stroop interference, or
insecure patients may be more attentive towith or without anxiety disorder in the pro-
cessing of threatening information because of negative material because it is consistent with
their state of mind. Third, we tested whetherregulatory differences in their respective at-
tachment representations (Dozier, Stovall, & differences in free recall and recognition
memory were associated with the security ofAlbus, 1999). We hypothesized that insecure
individuals with or without anxiety disorder attachment representations. Anxiety disorder
outpatients, as well as nonclinical compari-would be less able to remember or recognize
threatening stimuli than secure–autonomous sons with insecure attachment representations,
may show impaired memory for threateningsubjects, because they tend to defensively ex-
clude such information. Secure participants words compared to secure–autonomous indi-
viduals because they may tend to be less openwould be more open to process and discuss
negative information (Lynch & Cicchetti, to negative material and may defensively ex-
clude threatening stimuli.1998). The alternative hypothesis is that inse-
cure individuals would be more able to re-
member or recognize threatening information Method
than secure participants because negative in-
formation is more congruent with an insecure Participants and procedure
representational model.
Anxiety disorder group. Twenty-eight individ-
uals voluntarily participated in this study. TheHypotheses
sample consisted of 13 men and 15 wom-
en with a mean age of 34 years (SD = 11.2,In sum, threatening information may be pro-
cessed differently, depending on clinical sta- range = 19–67 years). They were all anxiety
disorder outpatients referred for treatment totus and attachment representation of the par-
ticipants. We examined the stages of attention a regional psychiatric hospital. The interview-
ing and testing took place in the period be-to threatening information (on the subliminal
and supraliminal levels), and of the recall and tween the intake procedure and the start of
cognitive–behavioral therapy. Participants wererecognition of threatening material. The fol-
lowing hypotheses were tested. First, we tested tested individually at the hospital. Participa-
tion consisted of five 1.5-hr sessions, in whichwhether insecure individuals showed more at-
tention for threat words in comparison to neu- the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule—
Revised (ADIS-R), the AAI, the Stroop task,tral words in the emotional Stroop task be-
cause negative information is more consistent two memory tests, a perception task not re-
ported on here, and several questionnaires,with their representational model or whether
the secure–autonomous subjects paid more at- among them the State–Trait Anxiety Inter-
view (STAI), were administered. Nineteen oftention to threatening information because
they are less inclined to defensively exclude the participants received medication at the
time of testing: 9 were using an antidepres-negative material. Second, we investigated
whether the anxiety disorder outpatients were sant, 4 were using a benzodiazepine, and 6
were using both.more attentive to threatening words than the
nonclinical comparison group because threat- Initially the sample consisted of 32 pa-
tients, but data were lost in four instances.ening stimuli are more consistent with their
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One participant dropped out of the study be- structured interview schedule, which provides
a differential diagnosis for the DSM-III-R cat-cause of a crisis and thus did not complete the
questionnaires, the Stroop task, and the mem- egories of anxiety disorders, mood disorders,
somatoform disorders, and substance abuse.ory tests. Two participants did not understand
the instructions for the Stroop task, and made The ADIS-R also globally screens for psy-
chotic episodes. Respondents are questionedover 25% mistakes, which made their results
unfit for further analyses. One participant was about medication use and medical history.
The diagnostic interviews in this studycolor-blind and thus could not perform the
Stroop task. Attachment classifications and were conducted by three clinical psychology
interns who were trained in the use of thediagnoses of these four individuals did not
differ significantly from those of the other ADIS-R and in adjustments of the interview
to DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric As-participants, χ2 (df = 2; n = 32) = 1.93, ns;
and χ2 (df = 1; n = 32) = 0.50, ns. sociation, 1994). All participants met DSM-
IV criteria for an anxiety disorder as a primary
diagnosis (panic disorder with agoraphobia,Comparison group. In order to get sufficiently
large numbers of nonclinical comparisons with n = 19; panic disorder without agoraphobia,
n = 5; social phobia, n = 2; generalized anxi-insecure attachment representations, about twice
as many participants as in the clinical group ety disorder, n = 2).1 All diagnoses were
checked afterward against the psychiatric as-were included. Fifty-six healthy individuals
were recruited from the general population sessments from the outpatient clinic; there
were no disagreements.by means of newspaper advertisements. This
comparison sample consisted of 14 men and
42 women with a mean age of 38 years The STAI Questionnaire. The STAI (Dutch
(SD = 8.1, range = 25–58 years). version by van der Ploeg, Defares, & Spiel-
Participants were tested individually at our berger, 1979) contains 20 statements about
lab. Participation consisted of two 2.5-hr ses- trait anxiety and 20 statements about state
sions, 1 week apart. At the first session, the anxiety. Participants indicate on a 4-point
emotional Stroop task plus awareness checks scale how strongly the statements apply to
and the AAI were administered. At the second them. Internal consistency (alpha) in this
testing, a number of questionnaires were ad- study was .94 for trait anxiety and .93 for
ministered, as well as two other tasks not re- state anxiety for the clinical group and .91 for
ported in this paper. At the end, participants trait anxiety and .88 for state anxiety for the
received Hfl. 50 for their participation. comparison group. The psychometric qualities
Initially the comparison sample consisted of the STAI have been found satisfactory, and
of 60 participants, but data were lost in four the manual provides norm scores. Both clini-
instances. Two of the AAI’s were lost due to cal participants and comparisons completed
equipment failure. Two other participants the STAI.
were left out of the analyses because of too In the nonclinical comparison group, the
much missing data on the Stroop task. scores on the STAI (trait anxiety: M = 41.4,
The final sample of 84 participants con- SD = 4.5; state anxiety: M = 37.5, SD = 7.3)
sisted of 28 anxiety disorder outpatients and were not significantly different from the nor-
56 nonclinical comparisons. Differences in mative scores for trait and state anxiety in
gender and age distributions between the clin- nonclinical samples. In the clinical group, the
ical and comparison group were not associ-
ated with the AAI classifications or the Stroop
response latencies. 1. Results on all measures and tasks were explored for
differences between anxiety disorder patients with and
without agoraphobia. Agoraphobics did not differ from
nonagoraphobic anxiety patients on any of the vari-Measures
ables in this study. This may be due to heterogeneity
within diagnostic categories (see Dozier et al., 1999,ADIS-R. The ADIS-R (Dutch version by de
Ruiter, Bouman, & Hoogduin, 1993) is a semi- p. 505).
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mean score for state anxiety was 56.2 (SD = ment on these 10 cases was 100% for the
three-way classification and 90% (κ = .80) for10.2). This is slightly higher than the norma-
tive scores for psychiatric outpatients (sixth the four-way classification. The other 10 AAIs
in the clinical group were coded by the firstdecile). The mean score for trait anxiety was
51.8 (SD = 12.9). This is somewhat higher author (I.Z.). Five of these AAIs were also
independently coded by the second authorthan the normative scores for trait anxiety in
outpatient samples (seventh decile). (M.v.I.). Across these five interviews, agree-
ment was 100% for the three-category clas-Compared to the nonclinical group, the
anxiety disorder outpatients scored signifi- sification and 90% (κ = .55) for the four-
category classification. Disagreements werecantly higher on both trait anxiety, t (33.2) =
6.91, p < .001, and state anxiety, t (35.6) = solved through discussion. The 56 AAIs of
the nonclinical participants in this study were5.02, p < .001. In fact, the STAI scores partly
mirrored the difference between the clinical coded by the third author (C.d.R.). All coders
were reliable with M. Main (Main & Gold-and comparison groups. For the total group of
clinical and comparison participants, the cor- wyn, 1994).
relation between the two STAI scales was sig-
nificant (r = .58, p < .01, two-tailed). Emotional Stroop task. Stimulus words were
three sets of 24 words chosen from a list of
2,250 words that had been rated by indepen-AAI. The AAI is a semistructured interview
with 21 questions and standardized probes. dent raters as belonging to one of five catego-
ries (ter Laak, 1992). For our study, wordsRespondents are asked for descriptions of
their childhood relationships, with their par- were selected from the categories labeled pos-
itive, such as “optimism,” “happiness”; neu-ents in general and in specific situations like
illness, distress, and separation. Furthermore, tral, such as “practical,” “short”; and threat-
ening, such as “murder,” “fatal.” All wordsthey are asked about memories of rejection
and threat by the parents and about abuse by had been matched for length (number of let-
ters as well as number of syllables) and forand loss of important figures. Respondents are
also asked how they think their childhood ex- the degree to which the raters had judged the
word as typical for the category. The latterperiences have influenced their personality
and (if relevant) their behavior toward their judgment is thought to be highly associated
with frequency in daily use.own children, and they are asked about their
current relationship with their parents. The Hardware. The words were presented on a
high resolution VGA color monitor that wascoding system of the AAI does not depend on
what respondents say they remember but on connected to a 386 microcomputer. The re-
sponse time was recorded in milliseconds byhow coherently they speak about their experi-
ences. Adult attachment classifications show a voice key (100–3000 Hz) connected to the
computer. The experimenter recorded thea reasonable test–retest reliability over 2-
month and 12-month periods, and they are in- color named by pushing a button on a re-
sponse panel.dependent of IQ, autobiographical memory,
verbal ability, social desirability, interviewer, Software. Before the Stroop words ap-
peared in the center of the screen, a fixationand coder (Bakermans–Kranenburg & van
IJzendoorn, 1993; Benoit & Parker, 1994; square was presented for 500 ms. The stimuli
appeared in 6-mm capital letters in one ofSagi et al., 1994).
In the clinical group, 18 of the AAIs were four colors (red, yellow, blue, or green). Par-
ticipants were instructed to ignore the wordcoded according to the manual (Main & Gold-
wyn, 1994) by the third author (C.d.R.). Be- meaning and name the color as fast as possi-
ble. They started out with 18 practice trials,cause AAIs of clinical respondents tend to be
more difficult to classify, a random set of after which all stimulus words were presented
twice in the subliminal (masked) and twice incases was classified twice independently. Ten
of the 18 interviews were independently coded the supraliminal (unmasked) condition, result-
ing in a total of 72 × 2 × 2 = 288 trials, whichby the first author (I.Z.). Percentage of agree-
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were divided into eight blocks of 36 trials. of 12 trials each. After each Stroop block, an
awareness block was presented. Half of theWords, masking condition, and word color
were randomly mixed, with the constraints time a word was presented for 14.3 ms, where-
as during the other half, a random letter stringthat each color appeared in 25% of the trials,
each word was presented once in each of the of the same length was presented. Both were
immediately followed by a mask of equivalentcolors, both the same color and the same stim-
ulus category could not appear in successive length. Participants were instructed to decide
whether the letter string appearing before thetrials, and for each participant, the task was
newly randomized. mask was a word, and to indicate their deci-
sion by pressing a button on a response box.In the supraliminal condition, the word re-
mained on the screen until the participant Participants showed only chance levels of per-
formance on this task, indicating they had notnamed the color. In the subliminal condition,
the word was replaced by a mask (a row of been able to consciously recognize the stimu-
lus words in the masked condition. Therefore,###s) of the same length and in the same
color after 14.3 ms (i.e., one visual display our assumptions about the subliminal presen-
tation were correct.unit raster scan). The masking procedure was
designed to prevent conscious awareness of Memory task. The stimulus set consisted of
12 positively valenced, 12 neutral, and 12the words but not semantic processing (cf.,
MacLeod & Hagan, 1992; Marcel, 1983). threatening words. These words were differ-
ent from the stimuli used in the Stroop task.The Stroop response latencies did not show
large skewness (.09–.37) or kurtosis (−.26 to The words were matched for length and num-
ber of syllables, and each word in each cate-−.90), and outlying values were absent (range,
395–572 ms). As is standard practice in this gory was matched with a word in each other
category with respect to frequency in dailyarea of research, reaction times were excluded
from the analyses when participants made use (ter Laak, 1992). The words were pre-
sented in three blocks, corresponding to theerrors. Excluded participants did not differ
significantly from the other subjects on attach- emotional categories (see Watts & Dalgleish,
1991). For each subject, both the order of thement or diagnosis (see the section, “Participants
and Procedure”). There were no differences in blocks and the order of the words within the
blocks were randomized. Each word wasStroop results between patients using (differ-
ent kinds of) medication or no medication at shown on a computer screen for 1 s, and every
2 s a new word was shown. Participants wereall, 0.75 < t (26) < 1.50, ns. There was no
significant relation between STAI scores and instructed to pay close attention to the words,
but no suggestion of a memory task wasthe response latencies on the Stroop task for
any of the word types (correlations of r = .03– given. After a 30-min distracter task (com-
pleting questionnaires), participants did a free.19, ns). Therefore, STAI scores were not in-
cluded as covariates in the Stroop analyses. recall and a recognition task. For the free re-
call task, participants were instructed to writeAge and gender differences were not signifi-
cantly associated with response latencies ei- down as many words as they could remember
from the previous word presentation. Whenther, and therefore were not included as co-
variates (see below). Correlations between they indicated they had finished, they were
encouraged once to try to remember moreage and response latencies ranged from .15 <
r < .22 (ns), and t tests for gender differences words. For the forced-choice recognition test,
participants were shown all 36 words from theranged from .14 < t (82) < .49 (ns).
Awareness check. To make sure the partici- original target word list and 36 filler words,
matched for emotional valence, length, andpants had been unable to consciously perceive
the stimuli in the masked (subliminal) presen- frequency, and again shown in random order.
Participants were instructed to decide whethertation condition, a forced-choice word dis-
crimination task was presented. This task con- they had seen the word in the word list before
by pressing a button on the response box.sisted of 96 trials, divided into eight blocks
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Table 1. Distribution of attachment classifications in the clinical
and comparison group (n = 84)
Dismissing Autonomous Preoccupied Unresolved
All participants 23 (21) 48 (45) 13 (11) 0 (7)
Anxiety disorder outpatients (n = 28) 12 (11) 8 (8) 8 (6) 0 (3)
Nonclinical comparisons (n = 56) 11 (10) 40 (37) 5 (5) 0 (4)
Note: Underscored numbers represent the four-way AAI distribution; nonunderscored numbers represent
the three-way AAI distribution.
Results cure–autonomous participants in our sample,
χ2 (2) = 8.44, p < .05. The four-way AAI dis-Results are presented in two steps. First, pre-
tribution (with separate classification of theliminary descriptive analyses focus on the dis-
“unresolved” category) also differed signifi-
tribution of attachment classifications in the
cantly from the standard probability distribu-
clinical and comparison groups. Further anal-
tion: there were significantly more secure–yses are based on the secure–autonomous and
autonomous participants and fewer unre-insecure classifications. Second, the hypothe-
solved participants in our sample, χ2 (3) =
ses on differences in attention, free-recall 33.67, p < .01.
memory, and recognition memory between Of the 56 nonclinical participants in the
secure and insecure attachments and between
comparison group, 40 (71%) were classified
clinical and comparison groups are tested.
secure–autonomous, 11 (20%) dismissing, and
5 (9%) preoccupied. Comparing this distribu-
tion to the AAI distributions usually found inPreliminary analyses
nonclinical samples (van IJzendoorn &
In this section, attachment distributions in the Bakermans–Kranenburg, 1996), percentages
anxiety disorder and the comparison groups in our sample were not significantly different,
are compared to meta-analytically derived stan- χ2 (2) = 5.88, ns (Kroonenberg, 1998). Three
dard clinical and normal distributions of attach- secure–autonomous and 1 dismissing respon-
ment classifications. dent were classified as unresolved. The four-
way AAI distribution (with separate classifi-
cation of the “unresolved” category) also didAttachment distributions. In the clinical group,
8 participants (29%) were classified as secure– not differ significantly from the standard
probability distribution, χ2 (3) = 5.07, ns.autonomous, 12 (43%) as dismissing, and 8
(29%) as preoccupied. Three respondents (1 The distributions of attachment classifica-
tions in the comparison and clinical groupsdismissing, 2 preoccupied) received a primary
classification as unresolved with respect to differed significantly: there were fewer se-
cure–autonomous participants in the clinicalloss or trauma. The distribution of the AAI
classifications is shown in Table 1. The AAI group, three-way AAI distribution: χ2 (2) =
14.33, p < .01; four-way AAI distribution:distribution in our patient sample was com-
pared to a standard probability distribution χ2 (3) = 10.84, p < .05 (see Table 1).
In the total group, there were no age orbased on clinical samples with adult psychiat-
ric patients (see van IJzendoorn & Baker- gender differences among the AAI categories,
for age: F (2, 81) = 1.31, ns; for gender: χ2mans–Kranenburg, 1996). The distributions
were compared with Multinom (Kroonenberg, (df = 2; n = 84) = 2.81, ns. In the clinical
group, there were no differences among the1998). The three-way AAI distribution (dis-
missing, secure–autonomous, and preoccu- AAI categories on medication use: χ2 (df = 2;
n = 28) = 2.31, ns, or clinical diagnosis: χ2pied) differed significantly from the standard
probability distribution: there were more se- (df = 2; n = 28) = 2.59, ns.
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Table 2. Mean Stroop response latencies (ms) for the
three types of stimuli (threatening, neutral, and positive)
in two conditions (masked and unmasked) for secure–
autonomous and insecure participants in the clinical
and comparison groups
Autonomous Insecure
Anxiety disorder patients
Masked presentation
Threatening 725 (92) 689 (170)
Neutral 720 (100) 691 (88)
Positive 720 (97) 681 (91)
Unmasked presentation
Threatening 911 (157) 773 (108)
Neutral 814 (107) 746 (119)
Positive 828 (127) 752 (123)
Nonclinical comparisons
Masked presentation
Threatening 701 (85) 772 (130)
Neutral 702 (86) 765 (119)
Positive 701 (88) 767 (121)
Unmasked presentation
Threatening 792 (115) 869 (170)
Neutral 754 (98) 829 (136)
Positive 759 (106) 840 (137)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Analyses of the Stroop response latencies We start with showing that the Stroop inter-
ference effect exists in the unmasked (suprali-and the memory tasks were performed for
two-way (secure–autonomous/insecure), three- minal) but not in the masked (subliminal)
condition. Subsequently, we test whether theway (dismissing/secure–autonomous/preoc-
cupied), and four-way AAI classifications Stroop effect was stronger in the secure ver-
sus insecure groups and was dependent of the(dismissing/secure–autonomous/preoccupied/
unresolved). Basically, the dismissing and (non)clinical status of the participants. Last,
the results of the free-recall and recognitionpreoccupied participants showed similar re-
sponse patterns, and the forced three-way memory tests for insecure and secure partici-
pants in the clinical and comparison groups areclassifications (Main & Goldwyn, 1994) did
not yield different results than the four-way described.
classification (see Zeijlmans van Emmicho-
Attention. Mean response latencies on theven, 2000, for specific data on these compari-
Stroop task both for the masked (subliminal)sons). Because of small cell sizes for the more
and unmasked (supraliminal) condition are pre-differentiated AAI classification systems, we
sented in Table 2. Repeated-measures analy-decided to present here the results of analyses
ses of variance (ANOVA) were conductedon the secure versus insecure attachment rep-
with attachment classification (secure vs. in-resentations.
secure) and group (clinical vs. comparison) as
between-subjects factors and stimulus wordAttention, free-recall memory, type as a within-subject factor for the masked
and recognition memory (subliminal) and unmasked (supraliminal) con-
ditions separately. The Stroop effect shouldIn this section, the results of the Stroop (atten-
tion) task and the memory tests are presented. lead to a significant difference in response la-
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tencies between words with a negative or pos- ening words in the unmasked (supraliminal)
test condition. The masked (subliminal) con-itive valence, on the one hand, and a neutral
valence, on the other hand. Therefore, (re- dition was therefore not included in further
analyses.peated) a priori contrasts between the negative
and the neutral words and the positive and the
neutral words were computed, after testing the Do secure–autonomous individuals differ
from individuals with insecure attachmentsignificance of the main and interaction ef-
fects. The repeated-measures ANOVAs were representations in attention to threatening in-
formation? The first substantive hypothesiscorrected for unequal numbers of subjects
across conditions. we tested was whether the emotional Stroop
effect in the unmasked (supraliminal) condi-
tion differed for participants with insecureDoes the Stroop interference effect of positive
or negative versus to neutral word valences attachment representations compared to the
secure participants. Because the two-way in-exist in the masked (subliminal) and un-
masked (supraliminal) conditions? Before teraction between word valence and attach-
ment was significant, F (2, 160) = 4.25, p =testing our substantive hypotheses, we tested
whether the Stroop tests triggered the ex- .016, we tested the a priori contrast between
threatening and neutral words for the interac-pected interference effects. The overall test of
within-subjects effects for the masked (sub- tion of word valence and attachment security,
F (1, 80) = 4.74, p = .032. With only twoliminal) condition resulted in a nonsignificant,
F (2, 160) = 0.91, ns, for the main effect of groups available (secure versus insecure par-
ticipants), this a priori contrast tested our firstword valence. Two-way interactions for word
valence by group, F (2, 160) = 0.36, ns, and hypothesis in the most stringent way, so post
hoc comparisons were not necessary. The se-for word valence by attachment, F (2, 160) =
0.16, ns, and the three-way interaction among cure participants showed a larger emotional
Stroop effect than the insecure participantsword valence, group, and attachment, F (2,
160) = 0.77, ns, failed to reach significance. did. Mean response latencies to the threat,
neutral, and positive words of the secure par-In the masked (subliminal) condition, re-
sponse latencies to threat, neutral, and positive ticipants in the unmasked condition were 851
(SE = 25.1), 784 (SE = 21.7), and 794 (SE =words were about the same (M = 722, SE =
12.6; M = 720, SE = 12.1; and M = 717, SE = 22.9), respectively. Mean response latencies
for the insecure participants were 821 (SE =12.4; respectively). A (subliminal) Stroop ef-
fect for the masked condition was therefore 21.7), 788 (SE = 18.8), and 796 (SE = 20.0),
respectively.absent.
The overall test of within-subjects effects Thus, secure participants may be more in-
clined to process information even when it isfor the unmasked (supraliminal) condition,
however, resulted in a significant main effect threatening than insecure participants, who
seemed to ignore or avoid the threatening na-for word valence, F (2, 160) = 33.38, p <
.001. For the unmasked condition, the a priori ture of the word stimuli. It should be noted
that the difference between the secure and in-contrast between threatening and neutral
words was significant, F (1, 80) = 41.08, p < secure participants was based on a within-sub-
jects repeated-measures ANOVA, and that the.001, whereas the contrast between positive
and neutral words was not significant, F (1, Stroop design precluded direct comparisons
between group means.80) = 3.10, p = .08. In the unmasked (supra-
liminal) condition, threat words stimulated
longer response latencies compared to neutral Do the anxiety disorder outpatients experi-
ence more emotional Stroop interference forwords (M = 836, SE = 16.6; M = 786, SE =
14.3; respectively). Mean value for positive threatening words than the nonclinical com-
parison group? Second, we addressed thewords was 795, SE = 15.2.
Thus, the emotional Stroop interference question of whether anxiety-disordered pa-
tients were more susceptible to the emotionaleffect appeared to be restricted to the threat-
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Figure 1. Mean Stroop reaction times (ms) for threatening, neutral, and positive stimuli in
the unmasked condition for secure–autonomous and insecure clinical and nonclinical par-
ticipants.
Stroop effect than the nonclinical compari- is consistent with their state of mind. In the
unmasked condition, the three-way interactionsons. In the unmasked (supraliminal) condi-
tion, the two-way interaction between word among word valence (threatening, neutral, or
positive), group (clinical vs. comparison), andvalence (threatening vs. neutral) and group
(clinical vs. comparisons) was not significant, attachment (secure–autonomous vs. insecure)
was significant, F (2, 160) = 4.15, p = .017.F (2, 160) = 1.90, p = .15. Therefore, a priori
contrasts were not computed. Our hypothesis The a priori contrast between threatening and
neutral words for the three-way interaction,of a stronger emotional Stroop effect indepen-
dent of attachment security in the clinical word (threatening vs. neutral) by attachment
by group, also appeared to be significant,group compared to the nonclinical group was
not confirmed. F (1, 80) = 5.17, p = .026. In Figure 1, this
three-way interaction is presented. In general,
insecure comparisons showed slower responseDo anxiety disorder and nonclinical partici-
pants with insecure attachment representations latencies than the secure comparisons, but
compared to their reactions to the neutralshow different emotional Stroop interference
compared with (non)clinical participants with stimuli, their responses did not show more in-
terference. In contrast, insecure anxiety disor-secure attachment representations? Third, se-
cure patients may be more open to threatening der outpatients showed faster responses and
less threat interference than their secure coun-stimuli that are more salient to them because
of their anxiety disorder, and thus show more terparts. In fact, the secure clinical partici-
pants appeared to be most susceptible to theStroop interference, or insecure patients may
focus more on threatening material because it emotional Stroop effect, in that their re-
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Table 3. Average number of correctlysponses to the threat words were considerably
slower than to the neutral stimuli. Post hoc recalled and recognized words for the three
types of stimuli (threatening, neutralmultiple comparisons (Fisher’s least signifi-
cant difference test) among the four groups and positive) for secure–autonomous
and insecure anxiety disorder participants(secure patients, insecure patients, secure
comparisons, and insecure comparisons) on and comparisons
the difference score of the response latencies
Autonomous Insecurefor threat versus neutral words confirmed this
interpretation. The secure clinical participants Anxiety disorder patients
were significantly slower in responding to the Recalled
Threatening 2.1 (0.8) 1.2 (1.1)threat words compared to the neutral words
Neutral 1.6 (1.7) 1.2 (1.3)than the other three groups (for each of the
Positive 1.4 (1.1) 0.7 (0.8)three comparisons, p < .05), which did not
Recognizeddiffer significantly from each other (for each Threatening 9.3 (3.2) 9.4 (1.7)
of the remaining comparisons, p > .05). Neutral 7.3 (2.9) 7.7 (1.7)
Positive 8.6 (2.1) 7.8 (2.5)
Nonclinical comparisons
RecalledMemory: Free recall Threatening 2.3 (1.6) 1.6 (1.4)
Neutral 1.9 (1.4) 0.9 (0.7)
Positive 2.0 (1.4) 1.3 (1.1)Are insecure individuals with or without anxi-
ety disorder less able to remember threaten- Recognized
Threatening 9.2 (1.8) 9.3 (2.0)ing stimuli than secure–autonomous subjects?
Neutral 8.0 (2.4) 7.5 (3.1)The free recall data were analyzed nonpara-
Positive 8.5 (2.0) 8.5 (1.9)
metrically because these data are at an ordinal
level. There were no differences in results on Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
the memory tasks between patients using (dif-
ferent kinds of) medication or no medication
at all. The average numbers of correctly re- more threatening stimuli than their insecure
counterparts.called words are presented in Table 3.
On the free recall task, secure–autonomous
participants recalled more words from all Memory: Recognition
three categories than insecure participants did
(positive words: z = 3.14, p < .001; neutral Are insecure individuals with or without anxi-
ety disorder less able to recognize threateningwords, z = 2.71, p < .01; negative words: z =
2.66, p < .01). Nonclinical participants re- stimuli than secure–autonomous individuals?
The average numbers of correctly recognizedcalled more positive words than anxiety disor-
der patients (z = 3.19, p < .001). In the clinical target words are presented in Table 3. Rec-
ognition data were analyzed for percentagesample, Mann–Whitney one-tailed paired
analyses (Bonferroni corrected) showed that correctly recognized target words. A repeated-
measures ANOVA was conducted with at-the insecure patients recalled significantly
fewer threatening words than the secure– tachment classification and group (clinical vs.
comparison) as between-subjects factors andautonomous patients (z = −2.16, p < .05).
Paired analyses of the word valence cate- word valence as a within-subject factor. There
were no interaction effects among group, at-gories (Wilcoxon) revealed that all clinical
participants recalled more threatening than tachment classification, and word valence.
Also, there were no main effects for group orpositive words (p < .01). Analyses of the in-
correctly recalled words revealed no differ- attachment classification. A main effect for
word valence was found, F (2, 156) = 6.87,ences between attachment groups or between
the patient and the comparison groups. p < .05. Post hoc t tests (with Bonferroni cor-
rection) were conducted for the dependentIn sum, anxiety disorder outpatients with
secure attachment representations recalled variables. The main effect for word valence
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was caused by threatening targets being better disorder respondents with a secure attachment
representation may explore, process, and re-recognized than neutral targets, t (77) = 2.89,
p < .01, and threatening targets being better member material more thoroughly, even when
this material is inconsistent with their attach-recognized than positive targets, t (77) = 5.21,
p < .001. In sum, threatening targets were bet- ment representation (Kirsh & Cassidy, 1997)
but consistent with the preexisting anxietyter recognized than neutral or positive targets,
but recognition was independent of clinical schema. It should be noted that threatening
stimuli may not even, per se, be inconsistentstatus and attachment security.
with a secure attachment representation. Lynch
and Cicchetti (1998) found that securely re-Discussion lated children with a history of maltreatment
demonstrate the greatest memory bias for neg-We investigated the effect of the mental rep-
resentation of childhood attachment experi- ative mother-referent stimuli. They suggest
that secure children may be more open to pro-ences on information processing in anxiety
disorder patients and nonclinical comparisons. cess and discuss positive, as well as negative,
experiences. The open admission of negativeIn brief, we found the largest emotional
Stroop interference for threatening words in experiences and threatening information would,
in fact, be congruent rather than incongruentanxiety disorder patients with secure attach-
ment representations, who also better recalled with their secure representational model (Lynch
& Cicchetti, 1998, p. 754).threatening words in a free recall task. From
their performance on both the Stroop and free Although insecure patients and secure non-
clinical comparisons responded with similarlyrecall tasks, we conclude that the patients
with secure representations were more fo- short response latencies to the Stroop test, the
former group recalled fewer threat words thancused on, and open to process, threatening
words and less defensive than either patients the latter group. For the insecure clinical par-
ticipants, the short response latencies and in-with insecure attachment representations or
the nonclinical participants. ferior recall of threat words are consistent
with the idea that the combination of their ba-
sic attachment insecurity and their anxietyAttention in the supraliminal disorder may lead to cognitive defense in the(unmasked) condition processing of threatening information. Both
insecure–dismissing and insecure–preoccu-Patients with secure attachment representa-
tions, who are sensitized to threat stimuli be- pied adults are known to avoid confrontation
with painful experiences in the AAI, but theycause of their disorder, may be more open to
process information that is consistent with use different strategies to reach this goal
(Main & Goldwyn, 1994). In a stressful sepa-their anxiety disorder schema but inconsistent
with their preexisting attachment representa- ration context, insecure children are inclined
to avoid looking at a picture of their parents.tion. At the heart of secure attachment rep-
resentations is the ability to be more open and Main et al. (1985) argue that these insecure
children (with insecure–avoidant as well asflexible in face of troubling information
(Kirsh & Cassidy, 1997; Main, 1999). Secure insecure–resistant mental representations of
attachment) look away in order to avoidrepresentations may lead to more active atten-
tion to and more thorough processing of stim- arousing painful memories (see also Kirsh and
Cassidy, 1997).uli that are especially salient and threatening
because of the aggravating anxiety disorder. In a study on cognitive control functioning
of maltreated and comparison children, Rie-Nonclinical participants with secure attach-
ment representations may not be bothered by der and Cicchetti (1989) found that the cogni-
tive organizations used by maltreated childrenthreatening stimuli because for them the sa-
lience of such stimuli is low in the absence of served to insulate them from external infor-
mation, so that external stimuli were avoidedan anxiety disorder. In the stressful context of
a Stroop task with threatening words, anxiety and the memory of such stimuli remained
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vague (Rieder & Cicchetti, 1989, p. 389). Us- compared to the neutral or positive words.
The stimulus onset asynchrony was put at aing a pictorial curiosity task that tested the
tendency to seek variation, Aber and Allen level that other studies (e.g., Bradley, Mogg,
Millar, & White, 1995; Mogg, Bradley, &(1987) found little initiative of maltreated
children compared to nonmaltreated children Williams, 1995; Mogg, Bradley, et al., 1993;
Mogg, Kentish, et al., 1993) have reported toin seeking out new information or in master-
ing new situations, which they approached in allow cognitive processing without conscious
awareness. Results from the awareness checksa flat and superficial way. The short response
latencies during the unmasked (supraliminal) indicated that participants indeed were un-
aware of the presence of stimulus words incondition and the inferior recall of threat
words in the insecure anxiety disorder pa- the subliminal/masked condition.
However, finding no differences betweentients may be the expression of a similar su-
perficial and avoidant way of dealing with the response latencies to threat words and neutral
or positive words in the subliminal conditionStroop task. In the current investigation, inse-
cure–dismissing and insecure–preoccupied leaves us to guess whether the word content
was processed and simply did not interfere orparticipants showed similar response patterns
in the Stroop and memory tasks (Zeijlmans whether nothing was processed at all. This
question can be resolved by using individu-van Emmichoven, 2000), which suggests that
insecurity per se is more critical for informa- ally determined masking thresholds (see Mer-
ikle, 1992) instead of so-called objectivetion processing than the specific types of inse-
curity. thresholds (see Holender, 1986). In view of
the ongoing debate about perceptual thresh-The general slowing of color-naming re-
sponses that we found in nonclinical partici- olds (see, e.g., Greenwald, Klinger, & Schuh,
1995), we will not enter the discussion on ad-pants with insecure attachment representations
is usually observed in studies that compare equate thresholds in subliminal conditions
here. However, for some of our participants,high-anxious and low-anxious individuals on
mental load tasks. This general slower re- the masking may have been too fast, prevent-
ing a differential effect in the subliminal con-sponse should not be confused with an emo-
tional Stroop interference that is based on the dition. A second point is that we randomly
mixed the stimuli from the different word cat-comparison of response latencies to threaten-
ing and neutral stimuli within subjects. The egories, which may have decreased the impact
of the words. Richards, French, Johnson, Na-general slowing of responses, instead, is often
interpreted as response inhibition and a lack parstek, and Williams (1992) report that indi-
viduals high in trait anxiety take longer toof attentional focus. For example, Fox’s (1994)
findings suggest that high trait anxiety may be identify the color of anxiety-related words
compared to neutral words when presented inassociated with a general inability to maintain
attentional focus rather than with an auto- a blocked manner, but not after a randomly
mixed presentation.matic attentional bias toward threatening in-
formation. Similarly, in their study on affec- An additional explanation for the absence
of a specific Stroop interference in insecuretive–cognitive information processing in
secure and insecure preschoolers, Kirsh and nonclinical participants (who were slow to re-
spond but did not show different latencies toCassidy (1997) found some evidence for a
general inability of insecure children to focus threat and other words) may be the fact that
the stimuli we offered were threatening buttheir attention.
did not specifically concern attachment-
related information. It has been shown in pa-Absence of subliminal processing
tient samples that both the relevance of stim-
uli to the cognitive schema and the negativityThe masked (subliminal) condition did not
provoke an emotional Stroop interference at of the material influence the degree of Stroop
interference (Williams et al., 1996). We in-all, in that the participants responded on aver-
age with similar latencies to the threat words vestigated this potential alternative explana-
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tion in a follow-up study of 42 nonclinical re- they are discriminated on the basis of their
overt verbal strategy.spondents, using attachment-specific stimuli
(see Zeijlmans van Emmichoven, 2000, for a Overall, all clinical participants recalled
significantly more threatening than positivecomplete report). We constructed a new set of
emotional Stroop stimuli to investigate attach- stimulus words, which provides support for
the idea that an activated threat schema pro-ment-related selective information processing
in the areas of separation (de Ruiter & van duces a memory bias (Eysenck & Mogg,
1992). This is also consistent with studies thatIJzendoorn, 1992) and negative social evalua-
tion (de Ruiter & Garssen, 1989; Pollard & showed that anxiety disorder patients show
superior recall of threat words compared toCox, 1988). These areas are thought to be of
specific importance to insecure individuals, nonthreatening information (Becker, Rinck, &
Margraf, 1994; Cloitre & Liebowitz, 1991;even when their insecurity has not (yet) led
to clinical diagnoses, causing attention to be Cloitre, Shear, Cancienne, & Zeitlin, 1994).
The occurrence of semantic intrusions ofdirected to these stimuli and consequently in-
terfering with task performance. In this exper- threatening material in the free recall task in
all clinical participants possibly indicates aiment, insecure attachment was again associ-
ated with longer response latencies across all general response bias in anxiety-disordered
patients, independent of attachment status (seestimulus word types. Apparently, the attach-
ment-related threatening stimuli did not dif- Mogg & Mathews, 1990). The threat schema
may be activated by the memory inductionferentiate any better between insecure and
secure–autonomous individuals than the and result in general selective memory for
threatening material.physically threatening words (Zeijlmans van
Emmichoven, 2000).
Sample characteristics and
recommendations for future studiesMemory
On the free recall task, insecure (dismissing Compared to other clinical samples, our sam-
ple included more secure and fewer unre-and preoccupied) participants showed inferior
recall for threatening words compared to se- solved participants. Although our clinical
sample consisted of outpatients, their symp-cure–autonomous participants. For the inse-
cure-dismissing group, this fits the hypothesis tomatology was severe. The overrepresenta-
tion of secure attachments and underrepre-that these individuals elaborate threatening in-
formation less well, as is also suggested by sentation of unresolved loss or trauma can,
therefore, not be explained on the basis of athe AAI, where they tend to show poor mem-
ory (Main & Goldwyn, 1994). It has been more lenient diagnosis. Another explanation
may be the recruitment procedure of self-shown that insecure–dismissing individuals
perform well on autobiographical memory selection: because participation in this study
was voluntary, it is possible that secure indi-tests as long as the stimuli concern neutral ex-
periences (Bakermans–Kranenburg & van viduals are more willing and unresolved indi-
viduals are less willing to expose themselvesIJzendoorn, 1993; Sagi et al., 1994). Inse-
cure–preoccupied respondents may be ex- to intensive interviewing and testing. In stud-
ies in which the research protocol is part ofpected to show superior recall for threatening
material, in line with their preoccupation with the diagnosis and treatment of (in)patients, the
attachment distribution may better reflect thenegative attachment experiences in the AAI.
Nevertheless, they too recalled significantly distribution in the population of psychiatric
patients. In a future study, the generalizabilityfewer threatening words than secure partici-
pants did. We suggest that both insecure–dis- of the outcomes should receive careful atten-
tion, starting in the stage of participant re-missing and insecure–preoccupied groups re-
act defensively at this level of information cruitment.
Co-occurrence of anxiety and depressionprocessing (Main et al., 1985; Kirsh & Cas-
sidy, 1997), contrary to the AAI, on which could not be completely controlled for in this
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study. By using the ADIS-R for diagnosing, cific, and attachment specific) and refine ex-
perimental conditions with individually deter-depression as a primary diagnosis was ruled
out. However, this does not mean that the mined thresholds for preattentive information
processing. Last, it will be interesting to com-anxiety disorder patients did not experience
any depressive symptoms, as it is a well- pare information processing and response se-
lection tasks to investigate similarities andestablished fact that the comorbidity of anxi-
ety and depressive symptoms is high. The differences in the nature of the insecure men-
tal representations of attachment.Williams et al. (1997) model for selective in-
formation processing predicts explicit differ- In sum, we found provisional evidence for
one of the most basic assumptions of attach-ences in the nature of cognitive biases in anxi-
ety and depression. In a future study of the ment theory: that the mental representation of
childhood attachment experiences influenceseffect of attachment insecurity on information
processing in clinical disorders, this should be information processing, in particular attention
and memory. Insecure (dismissing and preoc-accounted for by using more specific diagnos-
tic instruments that allow control of the level cupied) nonclinical participants show an un-
differentiated response inhibition suggesting aof symptomatology.
Furthermore, we recommend that future in- general inability to maintain attentional focus.
In anxiety disorder patients, secure attachmentvestigations into attachment-related informa-
tion processing compare different kinds of representations facilitate a more focused and
open processing of threatening information.threatening material (general, disorder spe-
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